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Abstract  Jonathan Quong proposes and defends the consensus, shared re-
asons, view of public reason. The proposal is opposed to the convergence 
view, defended, among others, by Gerald Gaus. The strong argument that 
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the sincerity argument. The present paper offers an argument that embraces 
a form of convergence and, at the same time, is engaged in respecting the 
requirement of sincerity. 
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1. Jonathan Quong’s Liberalism without Perfection is an impressive book 
which will strongly influence debates in political philosophy, and espe-
cially in Rawlsian political philosophy, in the future. Together with Ger-
ald Gaus’s The Order of Public Reason, this is, in my opinion, the most 
stimulating book in political philosophy written in recent years, and the 
two books, as, in many senses, two poles in the debate on public reason, 
will persistently be strongly influent in the future. It is a great occasion 
to discuss Liberalism without Perfection with the author.
The fundamental distinctive aspect of Quong’s proposal in the context 
of Rawlsian philosophy is that it defends the internal conception of po-
litical liberalism. According to such view, the main feature of public jus-
tification is that it is oriented to people who already endorse a liberal 
point of view. It is not required to offer justification to people who do 
not endorse the basic commitments of liberalism. Justification is meant 
as justification based on such fundamental commitments. The issue of 
pluralism does not regard pluralism external to liberalism, but plural-
ism that appears in a liberal society as a consequence of the free exer-
cise of human reason. As Quong says, “I do not believe liberal rights 
and principles can be consistently justified to persons who do not al-
ready embrace certain liberal values (e.g. the moral ideal of persons as 
free and equal, and of society as a fair system of cooperation). The in-
ternal conception’s more modest ambition – to work out a model of 
political justification for liberals – is not an attempt to do the impos-
sible, and thus it avoids the difficulties that beset the external model” 
(Quong 2011: 140). Liberalism without Perfection “represents the answer PUBlIc REaSOn. THE cOnSEnSUS anD THE cOnvERgEncE vIEw ELvIO BACCARINI
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to a question that is internal to liberal theory, namely, what should the 
structure and content of political justification be in a well-ordered soci-
ety, given the fact of reasonable pluralism? Given that we are committed 
to certain liberal values, what does that imply about the nature of a just 
and stable liberal regime?”. (Quong 2011: 137-160).
This fundamental aspect of Quong’s conception of political liberalism 
has several consequences, and one of them regards his approach to pub-
lic reason, i.e. the justification of specific policies and political and pub-
lic decisions in the context of a political society based on basic liberal 
commitments.1 As regards the structure of public reason, Quong’s pro-
posal is mainly loyal to Rawls’s concept that relies on consensus and 
shared reasons. On the opposed side there is the convergence interpre-
tation of the structure of public reason championed by Gerald Gaus. 
Not only shared reasons, but all evaluative standards embraced by the 
members of society are relevant for public justification. 
In the following part of the paper, I discuss Quong’s criticism and re-
fusal of the converge view of public reason and I try to offer an employ-
ment of justification from convergence that is different from Gaus’s. In 
my view, the basic public justification relies on consensual shared rea-
sons, but convergence has a justificatory role, as well. In some sense my 
claim is that both Quong and Gaus are right. But, on the other hand, I 
try to show that both are wrong (not an easy task, they are the two lead-
ing public reason philosophers in actual debates!). Gaus, in my opinion, 
is wrong because he refuses the shared reasons model and defends the 
convergence view as basic. Quong, as I see it, is wrong in thinking that 
justification by convergence must be totally dismissed. 
The consensus view puts comparatively strong limits to the reasons that 
may be employed in public reasoning: “First, there are the substantive 
principles provided by the political conception of justice, or the fam-
ily of liberal conceptions, all of which agree on the three general prin-
ciples” (Quong 2011: 259) that (a) contains certain basic liberal rights 
and freedoms, (b) assigns special priority to those rights, and (c) en-
sures that all citizens have the resources to make use of those freedoms” 
(Quong 2011: 198). To this, Quong adds “that the content of public rea-
son must also include the more foundational idea of society as a fair 
system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens, since this 
1   Quong endorses the broad view of the scope of public reason, as opposed to 
Rawls’s narrow view, focused on the constitutional essentials (Quong, 2011, 273-289).lIBERalISM wITHOUT PERFEcTIOn
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foundational idea will be necessary in order for citizens to publicly rea-
son about the interpretation, weight, and ranking of the general liberal 
principles” (Quong 2011: 159 n. 10). We may not appeal to comprehen-
sive religious and philosophical doctrines. The reason is that they are 
perennially controversial. A second important aspect of the content of 
public reason is represented by the guidelines of inquiry that specify 
ways of reasoning and the criteria for the rules of evidence in the public 
political debate from the general political content represented by a po-
litical conception of justice to more specific conclusions. 
For the converge view (championed by Gerald Gaus) a broader varie-
ty of reasons can be employed in public reasoning. In such a view, it is 
required that all persons have a reason to accept a rule, but different 
agents can base the justification on different reasons. A rule can be jus-
tified even if the reasons for acceptance of the rule for some persons are 
derived only from their comprehensive doctrines. In brief, a rule must 
be justified to all people on whom it is applied, but it is not required that 
the justification is based on a common set of reasons represented by 
consensual political reasons; different persons can have different rea-
sons and the appeal to comprehensive doctrines is legitimate. The only 
limit to the use of reasons is that they must be intelligible as moral rea-
sons (Gaus 2011: 279-283).
I defend the employment of convergence in the process of justification 
of laws, but I take it as an additional resource and not as an alterna-
tive to the consensus model. The latter is basic. Because of the fact that 
Quong fully embraces the consensus / shared reasons view, I avoid here 
to show possible reasons to take it as basic. For Quong it is not only ba-
sic, but the only legitimate model of public reason. In virtue of this, in 
this discussion I indicate why it is appropriate to employ the conver-
gence model as an additional resource. 
2. The first reason for employing the convergence view is that the con-
tent of the consensual base may be too general to lead to precise results 
– understanding and judgment may be required. Rawlsians are aware 
of the problem of generality of principles (Quong 2011: 148) and Quong 
tries to resolve it and the possibility of differences in their interpreta-
tion by relying on the understanding of the reasons behind them. This 
is why Quong introduces the more foundational ideas of society as a fair 
system of cooperation between free and equal citizens in the content of 
public reason (Quong 2011: 161-191). But the problem is that these foun-
dational ideas are very general, as well, and there is a problem for their PUBlIc REaSOn. THE cOnSEnSUS anD THE cOnvERgEncE vIEw ELvIO BACCARINI
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understanding. In cases of such disagreements, and the resulting diffi-
culties for justification from consensus, justification from convergence 
can represent an additional resource. To be sure, Quong is confident 
about the possibility of consensual resources to not be indeterminate 
(not disposing of answers to relevant questions) in public justification 
(Quong 2011: 281-289). In any case, even if public reason with the re-
sources conceded to it by Quong is not indeterminate, it is difficult to 
think that it will not be rather frequently inconclusive (will not have 
conclusive answers to many relevant questions). In order to resolve such 
issues, voting is the only alternative to try to find solutions with justi-
fication from consensus. It is not immediately clear that in such   cases 
voting is a better resource than trying to make use of the resources of 
convergence, as well. Moreover, I think that convergence, at least in 
some cases, can be a preferable resource, because it indicates to all citi-
zens a more direct reason to fully embrace a decision. 
Second, there is the question of unreasonable people, i.e. people who 
do not endorse the ideas of reasonable pluralism and the related idea 
of burdens of judgment, of society as a fair system of social cooperation 
among free and equals, as well as one of the conceptions of justice that 
(a) contains certain basic liberal rights and freedoms, (b) assigns spe-
cial priority to those rights, and (c) ensures that all citizens have the re-
sources to make use of those freedoms. There are at least four attitudes 
that we can take toward them. The first is simply to enforce on them a 
reasonable order. The second is to enlarge the constituency, i.e. the set 
of people and views that can represent the content of public reason, for 
example by changing the consensual ground, like Rawls does in the Law 
of Peoples (Rawls 1999a). The third is to merely establish with them a 
modus vivendi. My proposal is represented by the fourth attitude: to 
not renounce to the consensual ground represented by the basic con-
tent of reasonableness as the basis of a just order, but not to simply en-
force this order and the consensual ground on unreasonable people, but 
to try to develop arguments for unreasonable persons and justification 
to them, whenever possible. In some cases, maybe, this will be possible, 
but only through convergence with their comprehensive views. 
I find the issue of unreasonable people as particularly important for the 
question of stability. I agree with the Rawlsian project, and with Quong 
specifically, that gaining stability for the right reasons corresponds to 
acquiring “the reasoned allegiance of citizens. It is crucial for a just con-
stitutional regime to generate its own support in order to avoid decay lIBERalISM wITHOUT PERFEcTIOn
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and decline” (Quong 2011: 300). I agree, as well, that “normative stabili-
ty requires an overlapping consensus to exist on the core political values 
of freedom, equality and fairness. If enough people reject these politi-
cal values, then a normative stable democratic regime becomes impos-
sible. It is therefore essential that doctrines which deny the freedom 
and equality of persons, or the idea of society as a fair system of coop-
eration, not become so prevalent that they threaten to undermine the 
fundamental ideals of a well-ordered liberal regime” (Quong 2011: 300). 
However, unreasonable people will always exist, and even a proper ide-
alization must take this in consideration. An important part of the strat-
egy toward unreasonable people is to try to convert part of them to the 
core liberal commitments, or, at least, to avoid, or reduce, the presence of 
unreasonable people who are strongly inimical to the liberal order. Rea-
soning with them on basis of reasons that may be specifically acceptable 
to them, that are not strategic, but that look for convergence of various 
moral reasons, may be a good attempt to try to develop a level of civic 
friendship, or at least to reduce civic animosity with unreasonable peo-
ple. Justification from convergence may possibly help to convert some of 
them gradually, by showing, case by case, in as much occasions as pos-
sible, that the liberal order is not inimical to their comprehensive views 
(because there is a relevant field of convergence), or, at least, it may be 
possible to show them that the liberal order is not inimical to them be-
cause it can converge on relevant parts of their comprehensive views (al-
though there are differences that impede unreasonable people to con-
vert to liberalism) and that, therefore, there is no reason for them to be 
strongly inimical to the liberal order. At least, it might be possible to 
show that adherents to the liberal conception of justice are not disre-
spectful toward their fellow citizens who do not adhere to the liberal con-
ception. Here I borrow the words of Christopher Eberle, although his 
general intention is opposed to mine (i.e. he defends an overall legiti-
macy to pass laws even if based on non public reasons only): “There is, 
of course, no alternative to the frustration engendered by losing out in a 
fair and free political contest. But there is an alternative to losing out to 
those who exhibit a callous indifference to one’s well-being and thereby 
to the impact of their winning policies on one’s life prospects” (Eberle 
2009: 169). Obviously, there may be some comprehensive views, or un-
reasonable people, so strongly inimical to the core liberal commitments 
that attempts to find convergence with them does not make any sense.2 
2   The last sentence similar to what Schwartzman says in relation to reasoning from 
conjecture Schwarzman 2012: 521-544.PUBlIc REaSOn. THE cOnSEnSUS anD THE cOnvERgEncE vIEw ELvIO BACCARINI
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The third reason to complement justification from consensus with jus-
tification from convergence is the broadening of the scope of public rea-
son. I agree with Quong that public reason must regard not only consti-
tutional essentials and basic justice, but wider laws and public policies, 
as well. It is correct to try to justify such laws and public policies through 
consensus on reasonable political terms whenever possible, and some-
times we will find such public reasons during the process of justification 
(Quong 2011: 281-289). But it is still to be shown that this will always be 
the case. If the response will be negative, justification by convergence 
can be an appropriate additional resource. We had a relevant example 
of the helpfulness of employment of convergence in Croatia when we 
had the referendum for joining EU, when the parallel appeal, for exam-
ple, to catholic arguments, to the historical tradition of Croatia, and 
to the internalization of the solidarity of working class was important.
3. I go now to Quong’s criticism of justification from convergence. He 
mainly relies on the principle of sincerity. “Sincerity requires that we 
not support or advocate laws when we do not sincerely believe they can 
be justified to others, regardless of what those others may themselves 
believe” (Quong, 2011a).3 One of the reasons for supporting the sincerity 
requirement, according to Quong, is that it distinguishes public justifi-
cation from rhetoric or manipulation. In the specification of the sinceri-
ty argument, Quong says that there is nothing uncontroversial in saying 
“I don’t adhere to your doctrine myself, but I believe that your doctrine 
clearly supports a commitment to rule X”, but the controversial point is 
the claim “I believe your doctrine clearly supports a commitment to rule 
X, and I believe you are justified in believing the relevant part of your 
doctrine” (Quong, 2012a). If A is not able to endorse this claim, A can-
not sincerely believe that B’s endorsement of X satisfies the principle of 
justificatory sincerity, i.e. A cannot sincerely believe that X is justified 
to B. Here Quong is opposed to what Gaus says about justification, i.e. 
that it is path-dependent and what is a defeater in A’s system of beliefs 
is not a defeater in B’s system of beliefs. As a consequence of this con-
ception of justification, Gaus’s view is moderately relativistic. What can 
be justified to one person, can be not justified to another person. More-
over, a crucial aspect of Gaus’s view on justification is that a standard 
of justification can be a source of justification, without being justified 
3   Among authors that basically endorse a consensus view of justification, Nebojša 
Zelič appeals to the importance of sincerity and the duty of civility. Zelić 2012, Zelić 
forthcoming.lIBERalISM wITHOUT PERFEcTIOn
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itself (Gaus 1996; Gaus 2011). This is refused by Quong in his opposition 
to the convergence view. Only justified standards of justification can be 
sources of justification.
Schematically, this is Quong’s basic argument: 
  “1)  Convergent justifications amongst people adhering to different 
comprehensive doctrines can only be made consistent with PJS 
[principle of justificatory sincerity] provided each person in-
volved sincerely believes that the other people involved are jus-
tified in adhering to their different comprehensive doctrines.
  2)  The belief required in (1) is generally not possible unless citi-
zens accept certain epistemological or axiological doctrines (e.g. 
Gaus’s).
  3)  The fact of reasonable pluralism means we cannot and should 
not expect citizens in a liberal society to adhere to any particular 
epistemological or axiological theory.
  4)  Therefore, as a general rule, we cannot expect convergent forms 
of justification to be consistent with PJS in a liberal society” 
(Quong 2011: 272).
Quong thinks that Gaus avoids the conclusion of this argument by re-
nouncing to the condition in (1), i.e. to the justification requirement, 
and by substituting it with the intelligibility requirement. In my opin-
ion, Gaus has always followed the same concept of justification, as, for 
example, in his book Justificatory Liberalism (Gaus 1996). In his episte-
mological view, some reasons may be not justified, but be justificatory 
reasons at the same time. In order to serve as justificatory reasons, it 
is sufficient that such basic standards of justification are intelligible as 
justificatory reasons. But, says Quong, the appeal to such an epistemol-
ogy in public justification is not permitted in virtue of reasonable plu-
ralism: there are reasonable people who do not endorse this concept of 
justification, like, for example, externalists. Insisting on justification by 
convergence, as a consequence, has a high price. Either it is required to 
renounce to PJS and be engaged in public justification with insincerity, 
or it is needed to renounce to public justification and say that all views 
are legitimate simply because they are intelligible, even when they are 
not justified. In the latter case, as Quong says, Gaus renounces to his 
commitment for an order of public reason and opts for an order of pub-
lic intelligibility (Quong forthcoming). PUBlIc REaSOn. THE cOnSEnSUS anD THE cOnvERgEncE vIEw ELvIO BACCARINI
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I think that it is possible to reformulate the use of justification from 
converge in order to avoid Quong’s objection. In my answer, however, I 
depart from Gaus’s formulation. 
The important premise of my argument is that the context of the pre-
sent discussion is determined by the endorsement of the ideas of agents 
as free and equal, of burdens of judgment and of reasonable pluralism. 
In virtue of the burdens of judgment and of reasonable pluralism, it is 
not to be expected that agents will have equal standards of justification. 
Moreover, it is to be expected that they will be distinguished by plural 
evaluative standards. But every person is entitled to follow her stand-
ards of justification, in so far (like I endorse from the consensus view) 
as they do not conflict with what is justified by shared reasons relat-
ed to the foundational commitments of liberalism, i.e. to the common 
standards of justification of reasonable citizens (the idea of society as 
a fair system of cooperation among equals and reasonable pluralism, 
as well as the three main principles of liberalism). As Samuel Freeman 
remarks, it would be unreasonable to “not normally accept or tolerate 
people’s affirming and acting on the particular beliefs that provide them 
with reasons. Persons and principles of justice are unreasonable in so 
far as they do not tolerate or accept that false beliefs can provide others 
with good reasons for acting. […] To insist that others cooperate with 
you only on grounds and for reasons which you believe are true is the 
paradigmatic case of an unreasonable person. […] Respecting others as 
persons and as citizens involves allowing them to non-coercively decide 
their values and (within limits of justice) act on their chosen ways of 
life. This moral requirement implies a duty to allow others to make their 
own mistakes of judgment and action, and, within limits of justice, act 
on their false beliefs as well” (Freeman 2004: 2037, 2042).4 
So, it is possible for reasonable Betty to offer to unreasonable Alf this 
justification: 
(1) You are entitled to follow your standard of justification Σ in every case 
when there is not a successful defeater for the reasons that it justifies. 
This may be a common premise for Betty and Alf. Betty accepts such en-
titlement in virtue of her adherence to the fundamental liberal commit-
ments. Alf thinks that he is entitled to follow his standard of justifica-
tion Σ, otherwise it would not be possible to explain why he endorses Σ. 
4   To be sure, Freeman’s quotation, in his paper, is not intended as part of a support 
of any kind of justification from convergence.lIBERalISM wITHOUT PERFEcTIOn
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There are differences in the reasons why Alf and Betty endorse Σ, but I 
think that this does not represent a problem. If the justificatory con-
sensus on premises would have to be so deep, there would be problems 
with the justification of shared reasons among reasonable people, as 
well. Even in their case, it is left to each individual to look by himself/
herself for his/her justification of the shared reasons. In fact, below, in 
the discussion of the endorsement of the shared reasons, I try to show 
that a weaker conception of justification than Quong’s is needed, but I 
skip on the details here. 
For the sake of sincerity, Betty must explicitly declare to Alf the quali-
fication that she thinks that he is entitled to follow his standard of jus-
tification Σ in every case when there is not a successful defeater for the 
reasons that it justifies. Alf may think that there are no such defeaters if 
he thinks that Σ provides indefeasible justification, but I do not see why 
this is a reason for him to stop Betty’s argument at this point, and to not 
let Betty to develop her argument and, if she wants so, to try to find a 
defeater for some of the reasons sustained by Σ later. In the hypothetical 
case that I describe, Alf expects that all such possible challenges will be 
unsuccessful, but there are no reasons to debate about this at this point 
of the argument.
(2) The standard of justification Σ sustains rule R.
As a hypothesis, in order to exemplify the argument from convergence.
(3) R is justified to you if there is not a successful defeater for it.
Premise (3) follows from (1) and (2). 
(4) There are no defeaters of R.
As a hypothesis, in order to exemplify the argument from convergence. 
Alf can endorse (4) in the hypothetical case if he thinks that R is a pro 
tanto rule and there are no available defeaters in his standards of justi-
fication, but in the case that he takes R as an absolute rule, as well, be-
cause in such a case for him the possible defeaters of R are an empty set. 
Betty can endorse (4) because, in the hypothetical case, R converges 
with the liberal standards of justification. 
(5) R is overall justified to you.
This seems to me as a case of sincere justification, where no controver-
sial epistemology is implied. PUBlIc REaSOn. THE cOnSEnSUS anD THE cOnvERgEncE vIEw ELvIO BACCARINI
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One may say that in my defense of justification from convergence as 
an addition to justification from consensus I have simply reformulated 
Rawls’s justification from conjecture (Rawls, 1999b: 155-156). Let it be. 
The basic thing in my discussion is to show why a citizen, Betty, who 
reasons with an unreasonable citizen, Alf, on the base of his evaluative 
standard could be sincere. It appears to me that my explanation is sen-
sibly more concessive that what Quong admits in his position toward 
reasoning from conjecture. 
As he says, “reasoning from conjecture can be consistent with the PJS 
[only] if Betty believes there are sufficient shared reasons for rule X, but 
she also believes Alf’s unjustifiable comprehensive doctrine supports X, 
then I think she can engage in sincere reasoning from conjecture with 
Alf where she tries to show him his own doctrine commits him to X (but 
she probably ought to publicly articulate the shared reasons too if we 
believe in a strong publicity condition).” (Quong 2012a) 
If I understand correctly him, Quong refers to cases like in his (Quong 
2012) and Gaus’s (Gaus, 2012) dispute of cases where citizens endorse 
shared reasons that support a rule R, but some of them (championed 
by, let’s say, Alf) endorse additional reasons that speak against R. In 
such a case, the reasonable citizen Betty, who endorses R on the base 
of shared reasons, may engage in reasoning from conjecture with Alf, 
in the attempt to show him that his basic evaluative standard commits 
him to endorse R, exactly the rule that is sustained by shared reasons. 
The condition of shared reasons put forward by Quong for the legiti-
macy of reasoning from conjecture is clearly exclusive in several cases 
of reasoning from conjecture with unreasonable people. Only reason-
ing from conjecture with, let’s say, semi-unreasonable citizens (those 
that share reasons with the reasonable, but don’t think that they are al-
ways overriding) is saved. For the reasons indicated above, I think that 
such exclusion is not supportive of the requirements of stability and I 
hope that I have shown that there are no reasons based on PJS to en-
dorse such a restriction. 
Maybe it is worth deserving to question whether Quong’s limited ac-
ceptance of reasoning from conjecture is exclusive in another case, i.e. 
in the case of disagreements in the understanding of the content of pub-
lic reason (for example, in the understanding of the foundational ideas 
of society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citi-
zens), or principles that protect some freedoms, which interpretation is lIBERalISM wITHOUT PERFEcTIOn
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inconclusive in virtue of their generality. I am not able to say whether, 
for Quong, in the case of agreement on the general formulations about 
freedom, equality and fair society, but disagreement on their under-
standing, there are sufficiently shared ideas in order for reasoning from 
conjecture to be legitimate, or this condition is not present. 
To be sure, the problem of limiting the resources of reasoning from con-
jecture that I am pressing here, in particular with unreasonable people, 
is not immediately an issue for Quong, in virtue of his internal concep-
tion. But, as I have tried to show in virtue of the requirement of stabili-
ty, unreasonable people deserve specific care even in an idealized liberal 
society, as that pictured by Quong.
4. I indicate now two concerns related to Quong’s four steps argument 
that appeals to the strong concept of justification and the PJS. The two 
issues that I indicate are meant to question whether Quong’s strong 
concept of justification is appropriate for political liberalism, or it must 
be replaced by a more permissive concept of justification. First, it ap-
pears to me that Quong’s sincerity argument could be a threat to the 
proposals of several Rawlsians that endorse the shared reasons / con-
sensus view of public reason,5 as well as to Rawls’s himself.6 As Rawls 
says, the freestanding argument for principles of justice (the argument 
related only  to premises characteristic of public political culture of 
democratic societies and free from controversial premises of compre-
hensive doctrines) is only pro tanto justified. In order to obtain full jus-
tification, each qualified person must put in coherence her view with 
her comprehensive doctrines. Public justification is obtained when this 
is done by all qualified persons (Rawls 1996: 386-388). This is, in fact, 
a form of convergent justification and it is liable to the same objection 
raised by Quong to Gausian convergence view. 
I skip on the issue of how Rawls and various Rawlsians can deal with 
this proposal and I will focus on Quong’s reply. In Quong’s view, no role 
is played in public justification by comprehensive views. 
But there is a problem, nonetheless. Quong says: “The alternative view 
that I have offered [the internal conception] does not present the free-
standing argument – the move from the fundamental ideas to the general 
5   For example, Stephen Macedo says that reasonable citizens will be ready to adjust 
the freestanding justified conception of justice in order to render it acceptable to rea-
sonable fellow citizens who endorse various comprehensive doctrines Macedo, 2012.
6   One of the problems is raised by Micah Schartzman Schwartzman, 2012.PUBlIc REaSOn. THE cOnSEnSUS anD THE cOnvERgEncE vIEw ELvIO BACCARINI
86
liberal principles – as a pro tanto justification which then depends on an 
overlapping consensus in order to achieve a full or public justification. 
Because the freestanding argument builds on certain fundamental ideas 
that are already assumed to be the subject of an overlapping consensus 
amongst reasonable people, the conclusions of the freestanding argu-
ment should be taken as fully justified to all reasonable persons. Rea-
sonable persons are already assumed to have their own comprehensive 
or otherwise non-public reasons for endorsing the fundamental ideas, 
and thus the free standing argument requires no further justificatory 
support” (Quong 2011: 186). The possible problem is that even if all citi-
zens rely in public reasoning on ideas and principles assumed to be the 
subject of an overlapping consensus amongst reasonable people, some 
of them endorse these ideas and principles by relying on what others 
take as unsound justificatory reasons. As Quong accepts similarly to 
Rawls, the comprehensive or otherwise non-public reasons, endorsed 
by citizens, can be in an epistemological bad shape. This seems to me 
as a possible problem, in accordance with the strong conception of jus-
tification that Quong endorses in his use of the PJS in opposition to the 
convergence view. If we accept the strong view of justification, it appears 
the same dilemma that Quong puts forward to Gaus’s convergence view: 
either some qualified members of the constituency are not sincere to-
ward other members of the constituency (and think that others are not 
justified in endorsing the fundamental liberal commitments), or they 
endorse a controversial epistemology or theory of reasons. Everybody 
participates in the project of building or sustaining a liberal society with 
others in virtue of their common shared commitments, but here it ap-
pears to be an issue of sincerity, because some citizens do not see some 
other citizens as justified in accepting such commitments.
A possible explanation that says that the fundamentals of liberalism are 
self-justifying, will not work, because the foundationalist concept of 
self-justifying beliefs or reasons represents a controversial epistemolog-
ical view, something that is defined as a problem by Quong. In another 
reply, the fundamentals of liberalism may be taken as strong enough 
to survive in a process of reflective equilibrium (Quong 2011: 155-156). 
Their justification is obtained in reflective equilibrium. But, this, again, 
would not do the work, because reflective equilibrium is itself a contro-
versial epistemological concept.
Quong’s reply is that “I think an essential part of PL’s strategy of epis-
temic abstinence involves taking it as given that all reasonable persons lIBERalISM wITHOUT PERFEcTIOn
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are justified in endorsing the fundamental political values, and accept-
ing the burdens of judgement. PL does not directly enquire into the 
question of whether individuals are justified in accepting those values 
in order to abstain from controversial epistemological theories over 
which we assume reasonable people disagree. We just take the funda-
mental political values as given, and then can appeal to those shared 
values in any instance of public justification and stipulate that in doing 
so, we can assume our starting premises are justified to reasonable per-
sons. Making good on that assumption is something political liberal-
ism as a theory remains silent about: we leave that up to individual citi-
zens as part of the background culture or comprehensive philosophy” 
(Quong, 2012a). 
I have still worries in relation to how it is possible to say this, in coher-
ence with the criticism of Gaus’s convergence view, based on the sincer-
ity argument. Quong requires to Betty to refrain from justification from 
convergence of rule R to Alf because she does not believe that Alf is jus-
tified in endorsing his evaluative standard Σ. How is this different from 
Betty, who is allowed to reason with Alf on the base of shared public rea-
sons SRs, although she does not believe that Alf is justified in endorsing 
them? One answer is that in the former case Betty needs to investigate 
about Alf’s justification of R, while in the latter case she avoids to inves-
tigate about the justification of SRs, because she does not need to do 
so. But is this really so? Betty may have a strong rationale to investigate 
about why Alf endorses SRs. For example, she may want to know how 
stable Alf’s endorsement of them is. If Alf’s endorsement is based, for 
example, on a doctrine with contradictions, or too ambiguous formula-
tions, she may be wary of the stability of Alf’s endorsement. 
In any case, an attitude of attribution of merits to a person related to 
avoiding information about her merits appears as shallow. I suppose 
that every reasonable person would judge as regrettably shallow the sin-
cerity of a person in a relation with a spouse, or friends, if, for exam-
ple, she admires them, but she deliberately avoids knowing facts about 
them. Isn’t it a regrettable shallow attitude to admire a husband for how 
successfully he financially cares about the family, and neglect to get in-
formation about how he does so (perhaps he is a gangster). In a simi-
lar way, it appears to me that it is a regrettable shallow attitude to sin-
cerely engage in justification of public rules with my fellow citizens on 
the base of some sustaining reasons, if I admit that justification may 
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sustaining reasons (which is exactly what Quong establishes about jus-
tification in his criticism of Gaus’s convergent justification), and I ne-
glect to know about my fellow citizens’ justification of the sustaining 
reasons on which ground we are engaged in justification of public rules. 
A further problem is that in order to obtain justification in a strong 
sense, basing it on sound justificatory reasons is not sufficient. A per-
son must relate the justificatory reason R to the conclusion C with a 
sound inference. As Quong says, “in order for decisions to be justified, 
they must be grounded in sound reasons or arguments” (Quong, 2012a). 
But, as it is well known, ordinary people are not very good in develop-
ing good arguments. They are subject to logical mistakes and rely on 
heuristics (see, for example: Gaus 1996: 130-136). As a consequence, ei-
ther we must think that only epistemological elites can include quali-
fied members of the constituency, or we must renounce to the strong 
idea of justification put forward by Quong in his criticism of Gaus. It 
seems to me that the latter option is more congruent with the inten-
tions of public reason, i.e. not to exclude people as qualified members 
of the constituency because of not being more than ordinarily rational 
from the epistemological and logical point of view. It is true, as Quong 
says, that “public justification does not aim at mere agreement or con-
sent – the aim is for political decisions to be justified to each person who 
is bound by them” (Quong, 2011a). 
The problem, in my view, is that the conception of justification that 
Quong associates with PJS is too strong. I just indicate the issue, here, 
and leave a discussion of possible alternative conceptions of justifica-
tion for another occasion. 
6. At the end of the paper I raise some doubts about the relevance of the 
religious issues among supporters of the consensus and supporters of 
the convergence view. Contenders on both sides show the divergences 
on this question that derive from the employment of the justificatory 
structure, but I think that the topic is worth-deserving of further anal-
ysis, in particular more focused on specific issues, before reaching this 
conclusion.7 The initial ground for such a thought is that in virtue of 
the presumption of freedom, religious reasons can be efficaciously em-
ployed, for Gaus, only in the defense from coercion, not in support of 
7   It may be important, as well, to direct the discussion among consensus and con-
vergence view to debate which of them is more able to oppose those views that admit 
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requirements of coercion, while, on the other hand, the defense of reli-
gious rights is relevant for Rawlsians, as well. As Samuel Freeman says, 
“Only the most compelling reasons of justice, those regarding the pro-
tection of others’ fundamental rights, should be allowed to outweigh 
the freedom of religious doctrine, sacraments and liturgical practices” 
(Freeman 2002: 24).8
However, the opponents in the debate do not share my intuition. Kevin 
Vallier, for example, takes as one of the advantages of the convergence 
view the possibility to offer a stronger support to religious freedoms 
(Vallier 2011: 261-279). The main reason to which he appeals is that the 
consensus view restricts the kind of reasons that citizens may use in or-
der to stop coercive laws. In order to support his thesis, he indicates an 
education example, and he says that the convergence view, but not the 
consensus view, allows parents to object on religious grounds to a policy 
that organizes school curricula so that, in public schools, children are 
thought only shared and accessible reasons. 
The question is complicated. On one hand, as we see, for example, from 
Freeman in the quotation above, the consensus view allows strong pro-
tection of religious rights. On the other hand, it is not so clear how ex-
tended protection of parents’ rights in the education of children the 
convergence view offers. Let’s remember the teaching of J.S. Mill, who 
distinguishes among the freedom of parents in relation to choices in 
their life and choice in the lives of their children. The two questions are 
frequently conflated. But this is wrong. Children are not the property of 
their parents (Mill 1859/1977: 301-304). For this reason, there is a ques-
tion about, as Gaus would say, the jurisdictional rights in the education 
of children. As Brian Barry wrote, there are good reasons for the legiti-
macy of the state to interfere in the education of children, specifically 
in the context of school curricula, in order to protect their legitimate 
interests. Barry certainly opposes the presumption of the right of par-
ents to block a school curriculum that teaches evolution, or the bases of 
civic freedom (Barry 2001: 194-249). It seems to me that Vallier would be 
ready to accept such entitlement for the parents by the same token by 
which he defends the right of parents to block a school curriculum that 
teaches only shared and accessible reason. If he is not ready to do so, 
then he admits that parents do not have absolute jurisdictional rights 
in the education of children. But, then, the issue about the entitlement 
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to veto school curricula that teaches only shared and accessible reason 
becomes an open question, even in the context of the convergence view. 
In my opinion, there is a strong rationale for this, precisely the one ad-
dressed by Mill: children are not parents’ property. 
Quong may complain on his side to the, let’s say, ecumenical view that 
I show by expressing worries related to the clarity of the concept of co-
ercion. In his Three Disputes about Public Justification, he indicates dif-
ficulties by using an example that shows that the basic issue is not that 
of an independent definition of coercion, but of what is just and what 
is unjust. So, a possible problem might be that religious people can de-
fine what is just in accordance to their view and, consequently, define 
the legitimacy of a law in accordance to their view, and, consequently, 
again, enforce laws that override others’ evaluative standards in matters 
of personal life. 
But let’s remember that, for Gaus, it is possible to pass a law only if, 
for each and every person, no regulation of the field is better than the 
law regulation of this field by this law. This is a powerful tool to stop 
religious regulations of the lives of non religious people. Think about 
the (in many countries, like Croatia) controversial case of regulation of 
marriage. Religious people frequently require a regulation that forbids 
marriage among homosexuals. Gaus’s test is to see whether such a regu-
lation is better for all, than no regulation of this field. But for some ho-
mosexuals no regulation of marriage at all may be better than discrimi-
native regulation. Such a regulation is, therefore, defeated. On the other 
hand, probably, even for religious people it is better to have a liberal 
regulation of marriage than no regulation at all. As a consequence, the 
liberal regulation of marriage is the appropriate space of convergence. 
Quong, however, can still raise challenges to the legitimacy of employing 
religious reasons in justifying public decisions, by appealing to the prob-
lem that this will cause hard divergences with the liberal concept of jus-
tice. So, similarly to Vallier, Quong shows that the justificatory structure 
that he endorses is more suitable for protecting the fundamental ideas 
of liberalism. Think about Quong’s example of Anna, a rather reasonable 
citizen (Quong 2012a: 55). Anna accepts the core liberal commitments, 
but she thinks that they have not absolute priority over the commitments 
of her comprehensive view. In the balance of her political liberal and of 
her comprehensive commitments, among else, she generally accepts an-
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that only members of this religion (or, of any religion, which excludes 
atheists and agnostics) can be hired in religious associations, and this 
is the rule that she accepts as the best balance among all of her commit-
ments. Quong’s conclusion is that “if Anna is included in the constituen-
cy of public reason, then our theory will no longer be able to deliver what 
I take is uncontroversially accepted as a liberal right” (Quong 2012a: 55). 
The right to not be discriminated in employment policy is certainly a 
very high ranked liberal right. But, perhaps, the employment policy en-
dorsed by Anna is not so clearly illiberal, at least in some of its inter-
pretations, and after having considered overall liberal values and prin-
ciples. First of all, there may be some kinds of occupations in religious 
associations where the religious belonging of the employee is function-
al to the religion. For example, there are good egalitarian liberal argu-
ments to permit to catholic associations not to hire priests or nuns who 
are not Catholics. Among others, a strongly committed egalitarian lib-
eral like Brian Barry offers even a reasonable argumentation for the 
right of catholic institutions to limit the access of women to the role of 
priest, or, more precisely, denies to the state the right of being the um-
pire in such an issue. As he says, by quoting one US court: “who will 
preach from the pulpit of a church and who will occupy the parsonage” 
is a purely ecclesiastical question” (Barry 2001: 175). Admitting here the 
role of umpire to the state would simply mean to deny the autonomy 
of catholic religion as such. Those unsatisfied with this rule can try to 
change it from inside, or try to found a new religion that fits better with 
their worldview (Barry, 2001: 176).
A different issue is represented by jobs in religious associations that are 
not religious in their essence. Think about the case of a janitor in a re-
ligious school. Is the school allowed to differentiate here on religious 
grounds? In such a case, precisely the case of a janitor in a Mormon 
school, Brian Barry refuses the right to the differentiation, because it is 
not functional to the job. Being religious, or following religious rules, is 
not a distinctive feature for being a good janitor (Barry 2001: 166). Here 
Barry endorses a view similar to Quong’s: discriminating in the employ-
ment policy on religious grounds is not acceptable. 
However, things can be more complicated. As Gaus says, “Entrepre-
neurship is itself a form of human flourishing. […] Start-ups, innova-
tion, risk taking, organizing groups to resolve problems and implement 
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distributed according to ‘economic justice’: they are basic to evaluative 
standards of some Members of the Public” (Gaus 2011: 379). It seems to 
me a corollary of Gaus’s statement that entrepreneurship, and, in gener-
al, organizing associations can be more than a functional activity in the 
sense of leading financially successful systems, or providing good edu-
cation, and that heading such activities can be related to a worldview, or 
a broader value life project of a person or members of a group. 
I do not see as something that clearly must be outlawed leading an or-
ganization with, among else, an intention to show that “we Catholics,” 
or “we Protestants”, etc. are able to do this in a successful way, in par-
ticular if the intention is to show the possibility to do so in conform-
ity with a strict conformity to the general system of values correlated 
to the groups. In general, I do not feel sympathy for such kind of initia-
tives, but I feel, at the same time, a duty to be cautious in thinking that 
egalitarian liberalism allows requiring that they be outlawed. In some 
cases, I can find such initiatives as repugnant and I would boycott them 
whenever this would be possible to me, like, for example, if they in-
clude only people that are traditionally privileged in a society, or if they 
are inspired by hate for other groups. But, again, I am cautious in think-
ing that egalitarian liberalism entitles to require that they be outlawed. 
After all, coming back to the case of the Mormon school mentioned 
above, the US Supreme court did not refused the decision of the school: 
“All the justices united behind the rationale that it would be an interfer-
ence with the autonomy of religious organizations for the government 
to decide which non-profit activities are religious and which are not” 
(Rosenblum 2000: 90, quoted from Barry 2001: 167)
However, there might be a particularly strong reason to outlaw such firms, 
even in Gaus’s argumentative scheme. It is important to remark, as Barry 
does, “that the effect of the decision [of the US Supreme court in relation 
to the Mormon school case] was to give religious bodies extremely broad 
scope for exercising job discrimination – so broad that it might be thought 
to threaten religious liberty itself. For, as Rosenblum has said, “there is no 
sharper deviation from liberalism than coercing belief by conditioning vi-
tal secular benefits on declarations of faith” ” (Barry, 2001: 167). 
In conclusion, several things may be said in reply to Quong’s examples. 
There may be good public reasons to support the decision of religious 
organizations to hire only religious people, in some contexts. There 
might be good resources, in other contexts, for the convergence view to lIBERalISM wITHOUT PERFEcTIOn
93
rebut the proposal of a law that permits religious organizations to hire 
only religious people, or only people who respect religious prescription, 
because it might be reasonable to say that such a law threatens reli-
gious liberty itself. Gaus says that justification of public rules must re-
spect a structure of justification and that there are higher ranked issues 
that put constraints on the justification of other issues (Gaus 2011). Re-
ligious freedom is a high ranked issue in the structure of justification 
and, therefore, if it is threatened by a policy that admits employment of 
only religious people in religious organizations, then there is a strong 
case for rebutting such a policy. 
The previous discussion was not intended to be a conclusive proof of the 
thesis that the use of religious reasons in public justification is not a di-
visive issue with practical implications between the consensus and the 
convergence view, but only an indication that it is not obvious that it is 
so. Both Vallier’s, as well as Quong’s examples, deserve further discus-
sion in order to see what would be the outcomes of their discussion in 
the context of a consensus, as well as a convergence view of justification. 
Perhaps, it is not so clear that both examples represent clear counterex-
amples for a view of justification, instead of being disputable hard cases.9
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Elvio Bakarini
Javni um. Konsenzualno i konvergentno viđenje
apstrakt
Džonatan Kvong predlaže i brani konsenzualno viđenje javnoga uma ili vi-
đenje zajedničkih razloga. Predlog je suprotstavljen konvergentnom viđe-
nju, koga brani, između ostalih, Gerald Gaus. Snažan argument koji Kvong 
suprotstavlja konvergentnom viđenju jeste argument iskrenosti. Ovaj tekst 
nudi argument koji prihvata oblik konvergencije, ali se istovremeno zalaže 
za prihvatanje zahteva iskrenosti. 
Ključne reči:  konsenzus, konvergencija, Gaus, javni um, Quong.